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WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: ST. PETERSBURG: PARIS: WASHINGTON.

LONDON, *September, 1905.*

FOR the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan England, like all Europe, gives the first praise to Mr. Roosevelt. He has added immeasurably to an international reputation that was already greater than had been won by any American President of the past, except Washington and Lincoln. His position is now unique among the statesmen of the world—unique, because he is not more widely admired than trusted. There is another great ruler, not less individual than Mr. Roosevelt, endowed like him with many and splendid gifts, of equal range if of slightly inferior solidity, and with a temperament as generous and tingling as the President's own. Yet even those who are most appreciative of the Kaiser's personality cannot blind themselves to the occasional demerits of his policy, cannot say that the surprises he springs upon the world are always pleasant ones, and cannot always rank his influence among those whose tendencies, in Kant's expressive formula, lie in the moral rather than the pathological direction. But in Mr. Roosevelt's case there is not, happily, one opinion of his qualities and another of the uses to which he puts them. Both as a man and a President, he has succeeded in winning the unstinted confidence of rulers and peoples alike; and confidence has now been reenforced and buttressed by a profound sense of gratitude. I doubt whether any statesman has ever received so universal a tribute of thankfulness and regard as flowed to Mr. Roosevelt from the very heart of humanity on that memorable day when peace became assured. Nobody in England grudged Americans their boast that the peace was Mr. Roosevelt's peace. It was he who organized it; it was he, again, at a desperate moment, who preserved it.

As to the peace itself, England's first impression, like Japan's, was one of disappointment and surprise. It had been grasped by few that the Tsar, the head of a military Empire, could not, if he still retained any care for the security either of his person or of his dynasty, pay an indemnity while he still had an army of half a million men in being. Few had understood that for a Tsar under such circumstances to submit to this last indignity of defeat would be almost the equivalent of abdication. Few, too, had realized that the Tsardom was far from being at the end of its resources and that its powers of resistance, though taxed, were not yet within measurable distance of collapse. Few also perceived that the Japanese successes, decisive as they were, yet touched the real life and fortunes of the Russian people scarcely any more adversely than Magersfontein and Colenso touched the real life and fortunes of the British people; that Japan, in short, could not, unless she sent a fleet to the Baltic and bombarded and captured St. Petersburg, bring to bear the crucial and insistent pressure that can alone wring an indemnity from a beaten people; and that, though she might continue the war, and win more victories, and gain compensation in kind if not in cash, the cost of such efforts would be out of all proportion to their intrinsic value. The verbal theories and arguments for an indemnity had been reiterated time and again in every English journal; but the positive, impregnable and overwhelming facts against it had not been mastered either by England, or apparently by Japan, or by the world at large. There was, therefore, at first a feeling of vexed amazement when the terms of the peace were made known, and something more than a suspicion that the Japanese Plenipotentiaries had been outgeneralled. This feeling mingled with a hardly less unreasonable conviction that Japan had shown "magnanimity," when really she had shown the prudence which is the essence of statesmanship. The English press unanimously fell to praising her heart when they should have praised her head. The "Westminster Gazette" alone hit off the precise truth of the situation. It published a cartoon, drawn by Mr. F. C. Gould, who has a genius for politics as well as draughtsmanship, in which the shade of Bismarck was represented as addressing the Mikado with a dubious and puzzled air:—"So your Majesty has made peace without an indemnity!" "Yes, and without a *revanche*."

For the rest, British opinion has now come round to the more rational view that Japan secures from the peace not only every object which she set out to gain, but an Empire on the Asiatic mainland the possession and development of which must engross her activities, insure her prosperity, and satisfy her need for expansion for many generations to come. There is naturally a good deal of speculation on the durability of the peace. Has Russia, it is asked, really learned her lesson? Will she remain permanently content to be excluded from a warm-water outlet to the Pacific? Has the ambition and the dream of centuries been honestly renounced or will Russia begin at once to double-track the Siberian railroad from Moscow to Harbin in preparation for a fresh and mightier struggle twenty, thirty or forty years hence? No answer to such questions can at this moment be anything but tentative. But I think the general and reasoned disposition among Englishmen is to conclude that the peace is really durable for our time, if not for all time. There are many arguments to support this view. One is the reasonableness and the moderation of the peace itself. It leaves, so far as can be seen, no bone of contention behind; it positively paves the way for friendly cooperation. Another is the internal state of Russia, which, it is thought, will for many years make some contraction of her foreign activities inevitable. A third argument is that, having lost her only adequate naval base in the Far East, Russia can never hope to conquer Japan or to interrupt her communications with the mainland, and that any future war between them must, therefore, be, as this has been, a conflict between Little Russia and Big Japan. A fourth argument is that a further attempt to occupy Manchuria would involve a war not merely with Japan, but with China, too; and not with the China of to-day, but with a China whose armies had been reorganized and disciplined by Japan herself. For a Russian army to *march*—it could not be transported by railroad—through a Manchuria that was defended by half a million Chinamen, armed with modern weapons, trained by Japanese instructors, and fighting with the spirit they showed in the Taeping rebellion, would in itself be a most formidable adventure. But for that army, having accomplished this, to defeat the Japanese forces that would be hurled against it, to reach its objective—and it could have only one objective, Port Arthur—and to besiege and capture that fortress

when garrisoned by Japanese troops whose communications with their base of supply in Japan it would be impossible to cut—to suppose all this is, it is contended, simply to lose oneself in fantasies. England, in short, expects that Russia will accept the inevitable, will live on terms of amity with Japan, and will share with her in the peaceful task of developing the resources of Manchuria. That particular phase of the Far-Eastern problem which involved the question of Russia's or Japan's predominance is now, it is thought, finally settled—finally, I mean, as statesmen use the word.

With that result as its starting-point, opinion in this country proceeds along three main channels. In the first place Englishmen rejoice, for reasons that are ethical as well as political and commercial, that Japan and not Russia should be the Power to predominate at Peking and to hold the naval supremacy of the North Pacific. In the second place, Englishmen are relieved that Russia should at last have extricated herself from the Far-Eastern morass, and should be about to take up once more, though it may be only after a considerable interval and not in all her former strength, the place that belongs to her in the European system. It has been borne in upon this country by the incidents of the past few months that it is not a British interest that Russia should be weak in Europe; that the withdrawal or the diminution of her restraining power perilously disturbs the European equilibrium; and that an enfeebled Russia means a truculent and dictatorial Germany and an impotent France. There are at this moment some threatening clouds that can only be dispersed by the restoration of the Dual Alliance to its old and salutary effectiveness. And, in the third place, Englishmen are apprehensive that, hurled back from the Pacific, Russia may recoil upon the Persian Gulf or the Indian frontier in menacing force.

This brings me to the indirect, but exceedingly valuable, contribution which was made by England to the success of the peace negotiations. It was authoritatively announced on September 1st that Lord Lansdowne and Viscount Hayashi had, on August 12th, signed a new Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance. (Some of the Liberal journals, by the way, have rightly noted that "it is in itself a somewhat severe comment on the democratic nature of our institutions that this instrument, which

commits the country to the most serious departure in foreign policy that this generation has witnessed, should have been concluded, without a word spoken about it in Parliament, by a Government which, there is every reason for thinking, does not command the confidence of the public." The point, as a matter of constitutional practice, is well made. All Englishmen know—but the knowledge does not disturb them—that the fiction of popular or even Parliamentary control over foreign policy must, to a great extent, remain a fiction; that Westminster hardly even attempts to supervise it any longer; that Ministries nowadays are never, or very rarely, imperilled by attacks on their diplomatic arrangements; that a few men still mould the destinies of the nation almost as decisively as they did one hundred and fifty years ago; and that in nothing have the speculations of Macaulay and Brougham and the other leaders of the great theoretical age of Liberalism been more completely falsified than in the failure of the Parliamentary system, even when stretched to the full, to do more than register the decisions of the Executive in matters of external policy.)

The terms of the new Treaty have not, as I write, been made public; but it is, I think, a safe assumption that they are a very considerable extension of the Agreement of 1902, and that for the next ten or twelve years Great Britain and Japan for all Asiatic purposes of a defensive character will be one Power. The Asiatic possessions of each are henceforward, it is believed, guaranteed by the military and naval forces of both. The new Alliance will, in all probability, be found to uphold the commercial and political interests of every Power that is not avowedly bent on disturbing the *status quo* in the Far East. It is hoped that it will not merely preserve China against encroachment from without, but may prove the nucleus of a pacific league that will counteract, if not completely arrest, the international rivalries that have for too long centred on the Far East. If this surmise of its scope and duration is even approximately correct, it is clear that the new Alliance completely guarantees Japan's hard-won security and sets the seal of finality upon the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth; and that, knowing this, the statesmen of Tokyo were able to make concessions to St. Petersburg that otherwise they would have been obliged to withhold. Perhaps it is not going too far to assert that the new Alliance was the principal

factor in bringing about peace. Peace is, indeed, its sole object—a peace that will extend from the Persian Gulf to the Yellow Sea and unite Great Britain and Japan as much for the guardianship of the Indian frontier as for the protection, let us say, of Peking.

Obviously, an Alliance that is framed, or is supposed to be framed, for such vast purposes as these must raise many serious questions. What, for instance, is likely to be its effect on native Indian opinion? Will it be construed as a confession that we of England are unequal to the task of defending single-handed the Northwest Frontier against all comers? What again is likely to be its effect on England herself? She has recently been assured by her Prime Minister that she cannot be invaded. If she is now assured that her weakest spot is fully protected and that the greatest danger that threatens her Empire is removed, will she not, in her fatal complacency, be lulled again into that military stupor from which of late, after an infinity of prodding, she has shown a few faint signs of awaking? Moreover, there is the reflex action of the Alliance upon the relations of England and the other Powers that have possessions in the Far East to be thought of—particularly, of course, the relations of England and Russia. If the new Treaty proves to bear out its forecasts, Englishmen generally will regard it as a sort of lightning-conductor to pass on the shock of Russia's recoil from the Indian frontier and the Persian Gulf to Constantinople and the Bosphorus.

Once they are relieved from anxiety on the score of India, they will hasten, let me add, to conclude, if possible, a *rap-prochement* with Russia. For three reasons. One is that they realize, as I have said, that it is not to British interests that Russia should be weak in Europe. The second is that they are desirous of cementing their friendship with France by extending it to include the ally of France. The third reason is that they regard the uses to which Germany has already put, and the still further uses to which she may be tempted to put, her present diplomatic freedom as little less than a menace to European peace. It may, therefore, be possible for some future historian to date a new and happier era in Anglo-Russian relations from the Treaty of Portsmouth and the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

September, 1905.

THE international play in the last act of the modern world-tragedy, as seen by well-informed Russians, had two parts, of which the first, ending in the decision to call a Peace Conference, may be termed introductory and had for its visible *dramatis personae* President Roosevelt and Count Lamsdorff; while the second began with Witté's departure from Europe, ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth, and was played by a number of actors some of whose rôles and even names are still undivulged.

At present, we must begin the story with a well-merited tribute to President Roosevelt's splendid moral courage and unflagging energy, without which the effusion of human blood in the Manchurian millet-fields would have gone on for many a month unchecked. His mediation was an act involving a degree of courage almost heroic; and, for that very reason, public opinion in the United States wavered and hesitated whether to praise or blame it. In either case, it seemed a matter for superlatives, for the President's move was either a splendid deed of daring or a lamentable act of temerity. In neither case, however, had it the approval of professional diplomatists, whose traditional forms it laughed to scorn. Moreover, after the public and repeated declarations of the Russian Government, a brusque and brutal refusal was more likely than even cold assent. "Look after your own affairs and leave us to mind ours" is the gist of the reply that might have been apprehended. And then? But Mr. Roosevelt knew the Governments with which he was dealing.

The Mikado's advisers could not well refuse the President's invitation without forfeiting the sympathies of the American people, which Japan had worked so long and so strenuously to acquire. Besides, Japan could not decline any such proposal by whomsoever made without contradicting herself. It was her contention that she had been forced into the war; and it was her boast that she was at all times ready to make peace on terms that were reasonable.

Russia, too, had ample motives to close with the proposal. Since the Hague Conference she has had a name to live up to. She cannot play the part of the mere mile-stone, which points out to others the way they should go but itself remains where it is. But neither could she afford to incur the animosity of

the people of the United States, with whom were the nations, virtually, of all Europe. And there was still another and a very powerful motive at work. The Russian Government was painfully conscious that it had neither hindered nor modified the ideas and strivings prevalent in St. Petersburg and Moscow and elsewhere in the Empire about the war, and it was hopeful that the President's invitation would offer the needed opportunity.

Count Lamsdorff who had the matter in his hands viewed it from the domestic angle of vision. The proposed peace was to be used to strengthen the party of war; enthusiasm was to be roused among the masses; and the impossibility of ending the campaign was to be clearly demonstrated. Then the campaign was to be prosecuted vigorously. Count Lamsdorff formulated the problem thus: Not to accept the Conference would be to lay Russia open to severe criticism, and quite needlessly. For, on the one hand, as the Government would remain free at any moment to break off the negotiations, the Conference would be powerless of itself to stop the war; and, on the other hand, as the envoys' labors would finally end in smoke, Russia could afford to appear generous without sacrificing anything, and might then lay the blame for failure on the shoulders of Japan. Russia might then say: "You see, we truly wanted peace and, if we failed to get it, Japan's obstinacy is to blame and her exorbitant terms." But Europe would never have believed such a statement, the reader may urge. And the objection is real. Neither Europe nor any other country would have credited it. But then it would have been made, like so many other official communications, not for foreigners but for Russia's own people. If they accepted it, their sympathies might yet be won over and the war become popular.

Consequently, the aim and object of the Russian Government, in assenting to Mr. Roosevelt's proposal to send delegates to the United States in order to discuss the terms of peace, was primarily to create an effective apparatus for the purpose of rendering the war against Japan popular in the country. And it was in order that this aim should be compassed that the first part of the drama was played.

The second act was ushered in by the selection of delegates to represent the two belligerents at Portsmouth. For Japan, this was an easy matter enough, because she had won all battles

by sea and on land. Still, the number of candidates for nomination among the Mikado's subjects was limited. Thus, the Marquis Ito, as Russians believe,* refused to accept the mission, and Baron Komura came in his place.

The Tsar experienced much more difficulty in effecting a choice. For Japan, if not a victor, had at least won all the battles; and Russia, if not utterly beaten, had been driven with slaughter from all her positions. Hence the task of the Tsar's plenipotentiary was, to put it mildly, arduous and unenviable. And the conditions prevailing in St. Petersburg made it much more so; for, while the official envoy would be expected to act in his country's interests, irrespective of his own reputation and everything else, the Government in St. Petersburg would, when necessary, play for its own hand as well, and disavow him if needs were. Nobody, therefore, expressed or felt surprise when the professional diplomats selected by Nicholas II suddenly fell ill.

Then and only then did his Majesty depute Sergius Witté. At first, people thought that Witté would imitate Muravieff and Nelidoff and ask to be excused on the ground of ill health. He certainly would have done so, if he had shaped his action in accordance with his own interests. For he knew, as indeed everybody knew, that not only was the task beset with difficulties, but that it abounded in snares. Moreover, whatever the upshot, the Government was resolved to bear no responsibility for complete or partial failure, and to share with no one the credit of success. In the latter case, it would be said that the plenipotentiary merely carried out the instructions given to him by his Government; while, if the peace terms proved unpopular, Witté would have been thrown to the wild animals.

But patriotic considerations moved the President of the Committee of Ministers to undertake the work. "Patriotic motives," M. Witté calls them, and they were certainly that; but they were also reinforced by the consciousness of his own independence. He had long before severed the bonds that linked him to the Government, and had struck out a course of his own which he persevered in because he believed it to be helpful to his country and his people; and events had amply justified his ideas. Therefore, he was ready to repeat the experiment. He accepted the nomination and started for the United States.

* The writer of this letter does not share this belief.

Henceforward, then, the scene was occupied by Witté and Komura. Behind the scene stood President Roosevelt and, in the clouds, as *Dei ex machina*, the heads of the Russian and Japanese Governments.

To Mr. Roosevelt the world in general and the two belligerent nations in particular owe a debt of lasting gratitude, the extent of which is not even suspected. He undertook more than most people knew of; he discharged his self-appointed task more efficiently than any one acquainted with the conditions could have believed possible, and he deserves a much greater degree of credit for the conclusion of the peace than he is likely ever to receive or is willing to accept. That view, however, is not Russia's; it is but the deliberate opinion of the writer of this letter, who has formed it on the basis of a full knowledge of the leading facts. Good Russians, on the other hand, hold that the President's admirable work ceased with the creation of the Conference. Once the envoys came together, his enterprise fell off and success failed him altogether. The final result, peace with Japan, was therefore attained by others.

The firm conviction of those Russians who, regarding peace as a blessing, are unacquainted with certain aspects of the struggle by means of which it was won, is that credit for the achievement is due exclusively to Sergius Witté. His diplomacy worked the miracle. In this, as in every theory which obtains a firm hold over men's minds, there is certainly an ingredient of truth. Witté did unquestionably create an atmosphere without which the needful concessions would never have been granted by the Tsar. He cleared the ground for Roosevelt and for the wholesome whiff of public opinion which the President let loose against the secular court prejudices. The atmosphere created by Witté neither involved a vital concession nor ensured peace. But, on the other hand, the great event which the world has hardly yet ceased to applaud could not have taken place at all unless the surroundings were favorable; and, of these surroundings, some include a number of conditions independent of the human control which we generally class together as "chance," while others were the result of a deliberate and clever scheme conceived and executed by the Tsar's plenipotentiary.

Witté's first move was to convince everybody that peace was impossible. And, judging by the temper of the two Governments,

it was not only impossible but inconceivable. For they were both convinced that, if their respective armies had but a few months longer to operate, they would work wonders and create a wholly new basis for peace negotiations. Linievitch, Kuropatkin, Mishchenko and all the principal officers of the Russian army had, over and over again, written or telegraphed to the Tsar in that sense. And Nicholas II was certain they were right, and equally certain that it was his duty and his interest to give them the additional time for which they were craving and to go on with the war. And ethics? Nothing could be more ethical than that, his advisers urged. For it would mean permanent peace, whereas war without decisive victories would be at best a mere truce.

Witté compelled his own Government first, and most other people as well, to feel that peace under such conditions was not only impossible but undesirable. And when the Tsar, Count Lamsdorff and the politicians of the United States had acquired this conviction, they naturally imparted it to the Japanese. That was the first and principal step taken by Witté.

Now, the results of that "atmosphere," as it has been aptly termed, were peculiarly favorable to negotiations between the plenipotentiaries, for it rendered possible concessions which, under any other conditions, would have been beyond the reach of the most clever diplomatist. Confident that the war would go on, the Russian Government ceased to be chary of concessions which after all meant nothing and bound nobody. What Witté said, expressly or emphatically, was: "Show the world that you are conciliatory by giving all the concessions you possibly can, because that will enable you to convince the masses in Russia that the Japanese are to blame, not we." With that motive to push them, the Russian Government ceded on many points on which they would have otherwise stood firm.

The press, convinced that the campaign would be continued and that the Conference was but wasted breath, made persevering and strenuous efforts to coax or shame each side into meeting the other half-way. And, as soon as Russia had hurried through the eight clauses, relatively non-contentious, of the Japanese demands, politicians in the States began to say that Russia had shown herself very generous, and that it was Japan's turn now; and men of prominence who had invariably been admirers and friends of the Japanese gave it as their opinion that the Mikado

must make a supplementary sacrifice for peace, and that he could well do this without serious money losses or diminution of prestige. And Japan, who began to fear that Russia was playing to the gallery only and was resolved not to make peace at all, showed herself less uncompromising than before. But, when it began to become apparent that, perhaps after all, peace was probable, it was, of course, too late to take back what had been ceded. At the same time Witté cultivated the press. He chatted familiarly with newspaper men, took some of them into his confidence, won the sympathies of the American people and moved every wheel of the machinery of journalism. The advantages he reaped from this side were very considerable: public opinion was mobilized against Japan, who had condemned herself to silence during the time when silence was leaden and speech was golden. Some people said she was conceited and aggressive; others called her avaricious. It was this public opinion which moved Japan to withdraw her money claim.

By their self-denying ordinance not to take the press into their counsels the Japanese threw away one of their most effective weapons. It seemed a splendid spectacle, however, that of a nation's representatives calmly sacrificing the interests of their people to a stipulation which everybody looked upon as meaningless. "Better lose half the island of Saghalin than give an interview and break our word," one of the envoys is rumored to have exclaimed. And it would have been a spectacle worthy of the very gods if the Mikado's envoys had, indeed, held out to the last. Unhappily, they faltered at the decisive moment: they both gave interviews to one or more newspaper correspondents, by which, however, they gained nothing, explained nothing, yet lost the prestige which they had so laboriously acquired.

Another subject of reproach which has been made against the Japanese was their attitude on the indemnity. To give up the money claim in deference to public opinion was an act of statesmanship, the wisdom of which cannot be called in question. The Mikado undoubtedly did the right thing. But was it at the right moment? Here opinions may differ. But, when all the facts are finally known, it will be seen that the time was ill chosen. For what many people said, when the news first reached the outside world, was that it was the Japanese and not the Russians who had been bluffing. If they intended, as they must

have done from the very outset, to withdraw the money claim, why, it may be asked, did they allow their own people firmly to believe that a war indemnity was and would remain an integral part of the peace terms, and why did they permit the envoys to declare solemnly and emphatically that it constituted part of the "irreducible minimum"? To these questions there is an answer, but the world may not consider it satisfactory.

When the money claim was suddenly withdrawn and peace assured, the Russian Government showed no joy, no satisfaction. On the contrary, they waited for two days before making any sign whatever. For over forty-eight hours the world remained in suspense; nobody knew what the Tsar's advisers felt and thought. The Tsar himself offered no congratulations to Witté. Then, for the first time, the thought occurred to many that the Russian plenipotentiaries had, indeed, made peace on their own responsibility and while disregarding their official instructions. Those who were best acquainted with M. Witté asserted that nothing was more likely than that; and they added that, if this surmise should prove to be correct, Sergius Witté on his return to his own country would be quietly relegated to private life, or at all events "permitted to take a long holiday abroad," in which case we shall hear of him wintering in Rome, Florence or Naples.

PARIS, *September, 1905.*

A FEW years ago, in the obscure town of Auxerre, an unknown teacher, M. Hervé, used to write for a Socialist rag anti-militarist ranting which nobody read. One morning some petty scandal gave him an occasion of saying that two officers in the garrison had dragged the French flag in the mud. The rival Auxerre paper denounced this blasphemy, accusing M. Hervé of writing that the French flag rose from dirt. In a few days universal indignation prevailed throughout the press, and M. Hervé became as celebrated as if he had set fire to the temple at Ephesus. Seeing his opportunity, the bold professor sought a wider field and came to Paris, where he started a violent magazine destined above all for schoolmasters, and penned a History of France for the use of schoolboys, the spirit of which was anything but patriotic, and to which I shall have to advert later. M. Hervé rose in the estimation of the Socialist "comrades" with extraor-

dinary rapidity. He spoke at every meeting, became editor of another paper, and was elected a member of the highest councils.

When the presence of the Kaiser at Tangier and his Moroccan statements had to be construed by everybody as a threat, M. Jaurès in the "*Humanité*" and M. Hervé in the "*Avant-Garde*" gave two very different notes. The former said in a dignified and melancholy tone that, if France were to be attacked, the whole nation would rise in arms, as if the Socialist dream of disarmament already were a reality, and every citizen a soldier for life. M. Hervé chose a higher position, declaring that war—defensive as well as aggressive—was stupidity and barbarity, and that, in the event of a German invasion, the reservists ought to "strike." M. Hervé, further, pointed out with characteristic indiscipline what he called the inconsistency of his chief, M. Jaurès. Under no circumstances, he insisted, was any form of war reconcilable with Socialist principles.

The reader should be informed that the various Socialist groups had been unified under one Supreme Council when the "*Humanité*" and the "*Avant-Garde*" were expressing such divergent views, and that of the Supreme Council M. Jaurès was President and M. Hervé a private, though highly influential, member. Several Socialists who had made their mark in Parliament called upon the responsible President altogether to disown M. Hervé's principles, adding that they refused to be "unified" with a man to whom Socialism meant a repudiation of every national feeling. Strange to say, M. Jaurès, after a few days' visible wavering, preferred siding with the man who attacked rather than with those who defended him, and would rather bear the secession of such men as MM. Gérault-Richard, Clovis Hugues, Augagneur, etc., than do without the compromising assistance of M. Hervé.

As is natural with the thoroughbred Radical, M. Hervé evinced no gratitude for this treatment, and went on sneeringly trying to bring his superior to a sense of consistency. Besides a great many general arguments which he found to hand in the Socialist doctrine, M. Hervé unearthed one of a more individual character, and more likely to tell in a controversy of this kind. Some fifteen years ago, M. Jaurès had said in a public letter to the Italian Deputy, Andrea Costa, that the Triple Alliance was an excellent make-weight for French chauvinism, and he was now reminded of

his opinion of those days. From that moment, the editor of the "*Humanité*" agreed that war ought not to be countenanced on any account, that the patriotic idea, rightly understood, never involved it, and he began to defend this position against M. Clémenceau, whose keen, incisive wit compels him, day after day, to see that it is untenable. Shortly after, M. Jaurès made up his mind to fly where the diplomacy of M. Rouvier was creeping, and announced his intention of delivering in Berlin a speech which would preclude all possibility of a war now. This oration was never delivered; but, as it had been written, it soon appeared in print, and we know its main contention. People who hear of M. Jaurès exclusively as the leader of a party that ruled France for seven years and an orator of exceptional power, will be amazed at finding that this thesis, which was to keep war off, can be summed up in the very trivial proposition that "England, France and Germany, being the three brightest lights of the world, *cannot* make war on one another."

The circumstances which prevented Jaurès from delivering this astounding piece of political eloquence are well known.

The German Chancellor, Count von Bülow, thought it safer to have M. Jaurès as an ally in Paris than in Berlin, but his desire was imparted to the Socialist orator with a courtesy excessive even in a German addressing a Frenchman. The communication took the shape of a real diplomatic note and passed immediately from the German Ambassador to M. Jaurès. The Chancellor said that he appreciated M. Jaurès's opinions on foreign politics and often agreed with them. He had also pleasure in acknowledging his endeavors towards an *entente* between Germany and France. His objection to the delivery of the lecture, therefore, did not lie in the speaker, but exclusively in the hearers. As the opinions of the German Socialists do not materially differ from those of their brethren of France, we ought to conclude that M. Jaurès is looked upon as useful in France only because he would be obnoxious in Germany. In fact, it is not merely because the editor of the "*Humanité*" gives us *bravuras* on universal peace that the German authorities make so much of him. Certainly, M. Jaurès's efforts to weaken national feeling must, in the long run, prove advantageous to Germany, but his votes in the Chamber against all military expenses are a help of immediate effect, and if Count von Bülow has a

sense of humor, he must with difficulty have suppressed a smile when writing that he "appreciated M. Jaurès's views on foreign questions."

These compliments from the grand vizier of a monarch not to be accused of democratic tendencies have evidently warmed the heart of M. Jaurès, who faces his many assailants with more serenity than ever. He is at present engaged in the discussion of a definition of patriotism by a Paris schoolmaster, M. Bocquillon, which I will quote to enable the reader to judge for himself. To M. Bocquillon, warmly backed by M. Clémenceau, patriotism consists in "a passionate preference for one's country." M. Jaurès will have it that preference for one's country involves some degree of contempt for other lands, which, of course, means barbarity. Both the schoolmaster and M. Clémenceau handle him roughly for advocating patriotism without preference, that is to say, indifferent patriotism, but he takes comfort in the thought that he is several hundred years in advance of his opponents.

The rather unexpected intrusion of a schoolmaster in a purely ideal conflict will be accounted for by a few details which I will now give concerning the antipatriotic campaign in the schools.

I have said above that, on his arrival in Paris, M. Hervé had edited a magazine for schoolmasters and written a History of France for the elementary schools. Both the magazine and the History were good instances of the spirit which a strong party of theorists are endeavoring, with considerable success, to instil into the rising generation. This spirit is made up of antipatriotic Socialism and wholesale hatred of Christianity.

The anti-Christian campaign began under Jules Ferry some twenty-five years ago, when all the schools became undenominational. For the religious teaching which had been so far given to the schoolboys some substitute was found necessary. Men of such intellectual value as Paul Bert and M. Compayré set to work on text-books of civic morals likely to do duty instead of the banished Catechism. They were spiritualists, and their chapter on the duties of man was based on a chapter on the rights of God. This position was almost immediately disputed. The Radicals of the day maintained that undenominationalism meant atheism, and insisted that the idea of God should be left out of the elementary books altogether. Some atheistic catechisms of

morals were immediately compiled, and the standard books altered so as to suit the new tendency. Now, it would appear that the antitheistic movement thus beginning about 1880 has been steadily going on. For we hear at present strong protests against the teaching of morals founded on the idea of duty, no matter how de-Christianized, and we witness an attempt to have Kantian replaced by purely Benthamite morals. The child must be taught only that if he does right he will be a gainer. Whatever other motive is proposed to him is tainted with superstition.

M. Hervé began his *History of France* at the year 1789, and of the previous centuries ignored everything except their abuses. This was called the republican view of history. There is also an enlightened—as compared with a barbarous—treatment of the history of France. It consists in suppressing, or branding as immoral and unworthy of a civilized country, whatever is inconsistent with the form of patriotism advocated by M. Jaurès. The Jaurès of the primary schools is a gentleman whose name, once familiar only to persons interested in education, has now become famous in Parliament and in political circles, I mean M. Buisson. A professor, later on an inspector and a high official in the Department of Education, M. Buisson has always appeared as a dreamer in theory and a dangerous reformer in practice. A superficial broad-mindedness, which he likes to play off has been found several times to be little better than pretence. A philosopher in his study, M. Buisson is a violent Socialist in the lobby of the Chamber. As long as he had the superintendence of the schools, he did his very best to propagate “enlightened” history. One can judge of the extent of his enlightenment by a rather striking instance. Everybody knows the heroic action of the brave chevalier, who, being sent out to reconnoitre at some battle during the Seven Years’ War, was suddenly surrounded by a party of Prussians, and, instead of keeping silence, which would have saved his life, called out to the French and instantly fell under twenty bayonets. Finding in some school a picture of this scene, M. Buisson deprecated all exhibition of what he called a “bloody and murderous doing.” War to him is inconsistent with any display of really virtuous feeling and averse to true patriotism. This conception has been acted upon, and we do not lack elementary books from which the military aspect of our history is entirely banished.

The question now arises whether this view has already had some effect. It is certainly improbable that the French army, still under the uncomfortable impression left by the campaign of delation, should show the spirit which insured the triumph of the ultra-patriotic Japanese soldiers. On the other hand, well-informed observers generally agree that even the Socialist workman, once in a regiment, becomes a tolerable soldier unless he is an active propagandist. The strike of reservists proposed by M. Hervé would attract few adherents from the active corps. Will the strike ever be attempted? Nobody would dare to answer in the negative. It is a fact, and a most ominous one, that the Socialist propaganda is wonderfully successful among schoolmasters; and, if everybody knows how fervid a patriot the French boy usually appeared under the old method, everybody must see that the contempt of the enlightened for the barbarous is contagious amongst youth, and promises a speedy decrease of what used to be called patriotism. All the younger teachers are Socialists and antipatriots. Every one of the five magazines they read is written in the internationalist spirit. In the last issue of that edited by M. Jaurès, the leader exultingly boasted that one out of four schoolmasters is an active Socialist preaching the abomination of war. This may partly be brag. Yet, if it were unfounded, we should not see five Socialist magazines widely circulated among schoolmasters, and we should not see such facts as the two lately recorded, viz: the teachers in the department of Deux-Sèvres establishing a syndicate and having it entered, like any other trade-union, at the Labor Exchange; and two hundred schoolmasters in the Lozère signing what purported to be a patriotic protest, but which spoke of such an unripe idea as that of the United States of Europe as being quite a possibility. M. Jaurès is probably right in believing that the pupils of such masters will be free from antiquated and barbarous fallacies, and one is probably right in supposing that soldiers devoid of the same will be more inclined to fight like old Horace, *relictâ non bene parmulâ*, than like the self-prejudiced Japanese under Port Arthur.

Certainly, there would have been less bewilderment in this country when war with Germany appeared probable, if the delation campaign had not revealed such political divisions between our soldiers as must unnerve the best armies. M. Combes's policy

of distrust against whomsoever demurred at his radicalism had spread everywhere, and made everybody suspicious of everybody else. This feeling of insecurity has luckily partly made room for one of relief and hopefulness, the rise and progress of which I will now trace.

The reader must remember that a real panic accompanied the retirement of M. Delcassé. For a few days the Minister was treated as a scapegoat, and nine papers out of ten seemed to understand the indignation of Germany against him. This feeling gradually subsided as M. Rouvier prolonged his diplomatic conversation with Prince Radolin; but the whole press retained its first impulse, blamed the policy of isolating Germany, and advised immediate adhesion to the principle of the Moroccan conference. However, a sense of humiliation underlay this cautious attitude, and its presence was made manifest in a solemn circumstance. When M. Rouvier appeared before the Chamber with the short note he had toiled for three weeks to have drawn up in its present state, peace being restored without any injury to our national dignity, it would have been natural that the approval of Parliament should be unrestrained. Yet the note was read and heard in chilly silence; and when a member of the Right, M. Denys Cochin, rose to contrast the awkward feeling he noticed in his colleagues with their enthusiasm at the Anglo-French arrangement, a year before, he was suffered to go on, and raised no protest in reminding the Chamber that M. Delcassé's policy had for many years appeared reasonable and had enjoyed real popularity. The discontent against M. Delcassé's action arose, not from the action itself, but from the danger it had unexpectedly entailed. A feeling of this sort can only be transient. For some weeks more, there prevailed in the press a repining tone against the compromising friendship of England; and I saw some table-talk of Lord Charles Beresford's naval officers at Algiers taken up as sharply as if it had been of diplomatic importance and as good as a treaty. Gradually this superficial grudge gave way in presence of significant events. Early in July, an interview of Admiral Skrydloff was translated from the "*Novosti*," regretting that Russia should have declined a Japanese alliance. On the 7th of the same month, the "*Berliner Tagblatt*" boldly printed the words "Franco-German *entente*," and this hurry in forcing one's friendship on those one was threatening

only the day before was thought bad form. The visit of the English fleet at Brest had a cheering effect, and the meeting of the Kaiser with the Tsar in Russian waters an alarming effect. In the mean time, one could not but notice the really admirable composure of the English press, in circumstances which could only be unpleasant to English opinion. At no moment would the leading English papers try to dissuade M. Rouvier from adhering to the conference. The result of this presence of mind was the enthusiastic outburst of confidence in the whole French press after the naval *fêtes* at Cowes and London. Such unanimity had never been seen before. Plainly the lurking fear that France might find herself fooled appears at present to be a child's terror, and the combination of interest and sympathy which insures a comparatively solid alliance is realized in the Anglo-French *entente*. It is needless to add that the idea of having the United States as a third party in it meets with no opponent.

This renewed feeling of security is largely due to M. Rouvier. The Premier, throughout the crisis, acted like a man. Though, above all, a financier and little acquainted with the niceties of foreign politics, he would not throw on other shoulders a burden from which he would have seemed to shrink, and began negotiating with a directness and outspokenness which betokened perfect honesty, and would have placed the Wilhelmstrasse in an awkward position if the German diplomacy had gone on insisting on impossible claims. It does not speak well for modern diplomacy that M. Rouvier's first question to Prince Radolin, What is to be the programme of the conference? should have been regarded as a move of exceptional cleverness.

On another occasion, which seems to have been little commented upon abroad, the Premier gave proof both of a shrewdness and energy which delighted this country, which is always ready to admire firmness in the Executive. On July 13th, a Bill of Amnesty was to be proposed to the Chamber. The Bill was couched, as usual, in impersonal legal language; but it concerned chiefly, on the one hand, Déroulède and the Nationalists banished six years ago, and on the other, the officers publicly convicted of delation and punished at the time of M. Combes's defeat. The Amnesty would probably have been unanimously granted but for the violent interference of a Nationalist, formerly in the army, M. Lasies. This gentleman protested at the beginning of the

sitting against the impropriety of mixing up in the same Parliamentary measure a man like Déroulède, who confessedly is the soul of honor, with the cowardly tell-tales repudiated by the army. These words roused a furious tempest on the Extreme Left; and M. Berteaux, the Minister of War, and the only very active Socialist in the Cabinet, left the Chamber with a threat to impugn the Amnesty which he had so far approved. This sudden division in the Government and the excitement of the Chamber threatened a crisis, and the Socialists did not conceal their delight at this state of affairs. M. Rouvier, who was in the Senate, blissfully ignorant of the tumult, was immediately summoned. In such a case, M. Combes would have resorted to his ordinary method of offering his instant resignation. M. Rouvier, during the twenty minutes or so which it took to drive from the Luxembourg to the Palais-Bourbon, devised another much more ingenious solution. The decree dismissing the Chamber had been signed the day before by President Loubet, and M. Rouvier happened to have it with him. He merely read it to the Deputies, some of whom were amazed, some enraged, most of them pleased. As to the difficulty arising from the failure to reach a decision as to the Amnesty, M. Rouvier turned it by an easy legal fiction, by granting a pardon instead of an amnesty.

On the whole, the situation of France, both at home and abroad, seems unquestionably better at present than it was nine months ago. The presence of M. Berteaux in the Cabinet remains a difficulty, for it will enable M. Guyot de Villeneuve soon to resume the publication of his *fiches*; and, certainly, M. Rouvier would have preferred another Minister of War. I even know for certain that he offered the portfolio of War to no less a person than M. Casimir-Périer, the ex-President of the Republic. But the Nationalist campaign against delation has lost a good deal of its interest, and the country as well as the Chamber will be mostly intent upon the election. In January, M. Loubet comes to the end of his mandate and will certainly not stand for election again, for he has already taken a quiet flat in the most quiet neighborhood of Notre-Dame, and in April the general election takes place. Of this I shall have occasion to speak again. As to the Presidential election, the only candidates so far are M. Combes and M. Fallières; but the recent election of M. Léon Bourgeois to the Senate promises a dangerous outsider.

WASHINGTON, September, 1905.

ONE can but recognize a ripe knowledge of human nature in the Roman custom which prescribed that, just behind an Emperor, as he rode up the *Via Sacra* in a triumphal car, should be stationed a slave to murmur, "Remember that thou, too, art mortal." That was as good a way as any of averting megalomania, and of appeasing the corrosive envy that dogs the footsteps of success. There are favorites of fortune, however, who need no admonition, and who, of their own motion, make a timely sacrifice to Nemesis. Had elation impelled Mr. Roosevelt to crown his double triumph at Portsmouth—we may fairly call it double, not only because he brought the belligerents together, but because it was he who ultimately brought them to accept terms long deemed inadmissible—with the prestige of convoking a second Peace Conference at The Hague, he would have run the risk of exciting a good deal of jealousy and detraction on the part of European sovereigns and statesmen. Who is this man, they might have said, confidentially if not openly, who, being the Chief Magistrate of a people which for a century has held itself ostentatiously aloof from non-American affairs, now puts himself forward in the rôle of Pacificator of Mankind? By what solid potentialities is his presumption backed? He has behind him a standing army not exceeding 60,000 men, and a navy, which, although efficient for its size, is outclassed by that of any of three European Powers. Why should we tolerate a self-complacency which has so meagre a basis of military or naval force, and which is beginning to look a good deal like impertinence? Between nations, as between individuals, there is such a thing as swagger and bounce. Why should we not discipline this young man by declining politely his invitation to a second conference at The Hague, and by intimating with due courtesy that, if he will confine himself to an observance of the restrictions of the Monroe Doctrine, we, on our part, will try to do the best we can to regulate the affairs of Europe.

Mr. Roosevelt, in this instance, might have been excused from a scrupulous consideration of foreign susceptibilities, and from an anxious and wary propitiation of Nemesis, because upwards of a year has elapsed, as it has happened, since the Inter-parliamentary Union strongly urged him to bring together the nations once more in war-ameliorating, if not also peace-pro-

moting, conference at The Hague. The President not only granted the request, but took measures through the State Department to sound the great Powers on the subject. All assented cordially to the suggestion except the two belligerents, who, reasonably enough, replied that for them, under existing circumstances, a Peace Congress was scarcely opportune. The proposal, therefore, came to nothing, but a first move had been made, and, such is the comity between nations that we may be sure that a second conference would not have been suggested by any other Power than the United States, had not Mr. Roosevelt distinctly intimated that, in his opinion, the Far-Eastern War having been concluded, the initiative would come more properly from the sovereign who is justly credited with the first meeting of peace-lovers at The Hague. Thus it has turned out that the very circumstances which seemed to have committed our Chief Magistrate to a possibly invidious assumption of moral hegemony have been so shrewdly turned to account that his real influence has been enhanced to an indefinite extent by the discreet eschewment of spectacular exhibition. All's well that ends well. The American President can now say with truth that his Administration has not an ill-wisher in Europe.

Whatever strengthens the respect felt for Mr. Roosevelt abroad must inevitably tighten his hold on the esteem and confidence of his fellow citizens at home. We have beheld of late what almost looked like the dawn of a period analogous to that extraordinary "era of good feeling" witnessed in 1820, when James Monroe was reelected President by every electoral vote save one. Many of the President's warmest admirers are to be found in the ranks of the Democratic party. The Progressive Republicans pin their faith on him. Even the determined opponents of railway rate-making and tariff revision dare not come out in the open and defy him, lest they succumb to an avalanche of public indignation and disgust. The most case-hardened, cynical and wily politicians must have observed, and when, like augurs, they come together in secret conclave, they must admit to each other *sotto voce*, that, whether it be due to fate, or luck, or to the man's own sagacity, somehow or other, no good is to be got out of opposing Mr. Roosevelt. The opponent himself or his programme is apt to come to grief. Politicians who, avowedly or secretly, have arrived at such a conviction are beaten before a

struggle begins. Their nerves are unstrung; their blood runs cold; they have, in a word, no stomach for the fight. There are already indications that the Stand-Patters and the Anti-Revisionists do not want to face Mr. Roosevelt in the field. They foresee that, certain as he is to control a large majority in the new House of Representatives, and almost equally certain to command in the Senate so large a Republican contingent as, joined with the Democrats, would carry through almost any legislation that should bear his stamp upon it, they may find it impracticable to cope with him directly. Such being their reluctant and unwelcome forecast of the situation, they apparently mean to risk an extremely dangerous manoeuvre, that of executing a flank movement in the face of the enemy. They have let it be known, or guessed, that, before undertaking to tackle the President on what to them seem the vital questions of railway rate-making and tariff-revision, they will undertake to hamstring him, by holding up to public derision and rebuke the alleged mismanagement of the Panama Canal by the officials for whom he will be declared responsible. Now, it cannot be denied that \$57,000,000, drawn from American taxpayers, have already been expended on the Panama Canal strip, while, although some three years have elapsed since the money was appropriated, no decision has as yet been reached even with regard to the type of waterway which is to be constructed. Here, at the first glance, seems to be a specious ground for animadversion. The more thoroughly, however, the facts are disclosed and discussed, the more difficult it may prove in the forum of public opinion to make the President personally accountable for the procrastination and inefficiency with which the Canal Commission has been charged. The Commission would remain to-day as it was originally constituted, if some of the politicians, who are now loudest in criticism of the lack of progress on the Isthmus, could have had their way. It was Mr. Roosevelt who, after other plans for assuring the exercise of more fruitful energy in the prosecution of the waterway, availed himself of the powers reserved to him under the law creating the Commission, and reorganized it from top to bottom. Nobody questions, so far as we know, the expert qualifications, the vigor, the determination or the trustworthiness, of the present Commissioners. They can be trusted to carry out with promptitude whatever type

of waterway—whether sea-level canal or lock canal—shall be ultimately selected; while, in order to aid them and the President in making the right choice, some of the most distinguished engineers in this country and in Europe have been called upon to form an advisory board, which, at the hour when we write, is sitting in Washington. After a preliminary examination of projects, all the consulting engineers and all the Commissioners are to be conveyed in a Government vessel to the Isthmus, where they will inspect the route of the Canal and the work already accomplished. There is reason to believe that, before the first regular session of the Fifty-ninth Congress begins, the consulting engineers will have agreed upon a plan, and, if this shall meet with the approval of the Commission and of the President, Congress will be asked to make the necessary appropriations.

One thing may be predicted with confidence, namely, that no preference for a route other than that which traverses the Panama strip and was adopted by the French Company, will be expressed by the advisory engineers or by the Commission. The advocacy of the Darien route, with its five-mile tunnel through rock, or of the Nicaragua route, is a waste of breath, in view of the fifty million dollars expended by the United States in the acquisition of certain territorial rights from the Republic of Panama, together with the franchises granted to the French corporation. Any who try to raise the fundamental question of route at this late day will expose themselves to the suspicion of being emissaries of the transcontinental railways, which want no canal at all. We may also take for granted, probably, that reasonable persons will not countenance an effort to thwart, by the withholding of appropriations, the execution of the plan which shall finally command the approval of the collective wisdom of experts. An endeavor practically to overrule on the floor of Congress a decision vouched for by the consensus of many scientific engineers would be looked upon as inspired by very questionable motives. We assume, then, that a flank attack on the President's prestige, through the imputation of incompetence to the present Canal Commissioners, is foredoomed to failure. The American people will expect those who desire to weaken the general trust in Mr. Roosevelt to show cause more relevant than the procrastination ascribed to former members of the Commission, who have been dismissed by the personal fiat of the Chief Magistrate.